

























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 



















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 








Adriana Breccia Sequential Bargaining in a Stochastic Environment∗
Adriana Breccia
Abstract
This paper investigates the uniqueness of subgame perfect (SP) payoﬀs in a
sequential bargaining game. Players are completely informed and the surplus to be
allocated follows a geometric Brownian motion. This bargaining problem has not
been analysed exhaustively in a stochastic environment. The aim of this paper is
to provide a technique to identify the subgame perfect equilibria, i.e. the timing
of the agreement and the SP payoﬀ at which agreement occurs. Even though the
main focus is on the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we investigate other features of
the equilibrium, such as the Pareto eﬃciency of the outcome and the relation with
the Nash axiomatic approach.
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helpful suggestions and discussions. Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York,
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1Introduction
Since the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982) the basic two-player game has been general-
ized, inspiring a vast literature covering theoretical issues as well as economic and ﬁnance
applications.
The extension of the Rubinstein model to the stochastic case is a new research area1.
Even though the theoretical and applied works in the ﬁeld of non cooperative bargaining
have covered a broad variety of issues, the extension of the basic model (with players
completely informed about their preferences) to the stochastic environment seems to have
made some inroads just recently.
There are only few papers on sequential games where a stochastic process drives the
order of the moves and/or the “pie” to be shared. In particular, we will focus on two
papers investigating the Rubinstein alternating-oﬀer model in a stochastic environment.
Merlo and Wilson (1995) derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence and
uniqueness of subgame perfect and stationary subgame perfect payoﬀs in a generalised
setting. There are ‘n’ players, proposers alternate randomly and/or the pie moves sto-
chastically with time. In particular, the uncertainty does not take any speciﬁc form, the
underlying stochastic process is left unspeciﬁed such that their conclusions on existence
and uniqueness of subgame perfect (SP) payoﬀ can apply to a multiplicity of stochastic
processes. However, given the generality of the underlying process, a number of perverse
results are possible and a conclusive result on issues like eﬃciency of the equilibria does
not seem feasible. This makes quite hard to apply their theoretical result as a technical
tool to solve a bargaining situation in a more speciﬁc stochastic framework.
A more speciﬁc application is given in Cripps (1997) who analyses a Rubinstein al-
ternating bargaining situation where the pie moves accordingly to a geometric Brownian
motion. The focus is from an applied perspective and the aim is to solve a long and
short-term wage negotiation between a ﬁrm and a labour union. The equilibrium found is
unique in the ‘C2’ class of functions, however a general characterisation of the uniqueness
is a technical issue that is beyond the scope of his paper (Cripps, 1997 p. 536).
The main purpose of this essay is to reﬁne and extend the model developed by Cripps.
First, the essential technical reﬁnement is the characterisation of the equilibrium in terms
of uniqueness. In doing this, drawing on the same bargaining situation as in Cripps,
we provide the characterisation of SP equilibrium payoﬀs and the technical steps yield-
ing the unique SP equilibrium of the model. In particular, the focus is on stationary
1For a discussion on this issue see Muthoo (1999).
2subgame perfect (SSP) payoﬀs because in a two-player game the SSP payoﬀ is unique
if and only if SP payoﬀ is unique2. Second, the current paper extends Cripps’ analysis
by investigating the Pareto eﬃciency of the bargaining outcome. Third, we analyse the
equilibrium outcome in the alternative situation where players can bargain cooperatively
in a Nash demand game. Finally we compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two al-
ternative bargaining situations – non-cooperative Rubinstein framework and cooperative
Nash bargaining. This comparison highlights the delay in the investment decision due to
the lack of a cooperative environment.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we brieﬂy describe the bargaining pro-
cedure in the basic deterministic case and in section 1.1, the speciﬁc bargaining problem
– negotiation over wage contracts – when the pie is stochastic3. In section 2, we provide a
characterisation of the SSP payoﬀs by deﬁning an upper and a lower bound respectively
to the supremum and the inﬁmum of the SSP outcomes. The main question concerns
the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ. In section 3, the existence of
a unique SSP outcome is proved by shrinking the set of SSP payoﬀs to a single point4.
In this section the solution depends on the time interval elapsing between an oﬀer and
counteroﬀer, however in the rest of the paper continuous time is assumed. The main result
following from this section is that there exists a unique SSP partition of the pie at which
players agree immediately if the state variable starts suﬃciently high (above a constant
threshold level). The level of the stochastic cash ﬂows that triggers such an agreement is
assumed to exist in the sense of being ﬁnite.
In section 4, we solve for the unknown threshold level that triggers an agreement.
Then we investigate the timing of the agreement for any initial level of the state variable
in order to detect if any earlier SSP agreement is feasible when the state variable starts
suﬃciently low. One may notice how this technique closely resembles a kind of backward
induction even though the time horizon is inﬁnite.
In subsection 4.1, we draw the main conclusions on timing and eﬃciency of the SSP
outcome. Whether the SSP outcome is Pareto eﬃcient is a minor, though relevant,
question. In the basic model the SSP outcome is eﬃcient and an agreement is reached at
the ﬁrst round of the game. Alternatively, in a stochastic framework, agreement could be
2This follows the fact that in a two player game extremal SP payoﬀs are also SSP payoﬀs. See Merlo
and Wilson (1995, p.391).
3The notation here is the same as in Cripps so that a comparison with his result may be straightforward
to the reader.
4We will do this by using the upper and lower bounds from section 2.
3delayed because players perceive that by waiting they receive an improved payoﬀ. In such
a case, as concluded by Merlo and Wilson (1995, p.385), it cannot be that any feasible
state contingent outcome can be agreed upon in the current state and in such a case
one cannot guarantee that a SSP equilibrium is Pareto optimal. However, in the current
paper, it is straightforward to show that if there is a delay (because the state variable
starts suﬃciently low) the SSP outcome at agreement is still Pareto eﬃcient.
Before concluding, in section 5 we brieﬂy introduce the Nash bargaining problem in
order to make a comparison with the Rubinstein sequential bargaining. In the Nash
framework, the Pareto optimality condition is deﬁned more explicitly because the eﬃ-
ciency is one of the axioms the Nash solution must satisfy. We show then how the Nash
and the SSP outcomes satisfy the eﬃciency condition. This relation, through the Pareto
optimality, facilitates a comparison between the two bargaining situations. This compar-
ison is quite useful if one notices that the eﬃcient SSP outcome is the implicit solution
of a polynomial equation of degree λ > 1. In contrast, the Nash bargaining solution is
explicitly deﬁned and easy to calculate. From this comparison one can conclude that, with
respect to the Nash outcome, the eﬃcient SSP agreement occurs at a higher level of the
the state variable and, hence, the lack of cooperation delays agreements and investment
decisions.
1 Alternating-Oﬀer Game: Bargaining Procedure
In this section, we will brieﬂy go through the basic deterministic model of sequential
bargaining. We will do this by summarising the bargaining procedure and the outcome
without dealing with other features of the solution such as subgame perfection, uniqueness
and eﬃciency. These features will be described extensively in the following section for the
stochastic case.
The main features of this type of bargaining are (i) the bargaining has an inﬁnite
horizon and (ii) it is costly.
Two players, say 1 and 2, have the opportunity to share a pie of size 1. They alternate
between making an oﬀer at discrete points in time. To allow for serious oﬀers, assume the
two agents are impatient with discount factors 0 < Di < 1, i = 1,2. The impatience then
represents the cost of bargaining. Assume player 1 starts the negotiation. He proposes at
time zero a partition of the pie x = (x1,x2) with x1 + x2 = 1. Player 2 can either accept
this proposal, in which case the game ends with the implementation of the partition x,
or reject it. If he rejects, the game moves on by a time period ∆, with player 2 making
4a proposal y = (y1,y2) with y1 + y2 = 1. If the oﬀer is rejected the game goes on with
a sequence of alternating oﬀers until an proposal is accepted. If the bargaining never
reaches an agreement both players receive a zero payoﬀ as the discounted pie shrinks to
zero.

















and the agreement is reached at the ﬁrst round5.
1.1 Alternating-Oﬀer Over a Stochastic Pie
The purpose of this section is ﬁrst to describe the features of the wage negotiation (and
hence the features of the wage-contract), then we will describe the bargaining procedure.
An entrepreneur has the opportunity to invest in a project generating an instantaneous
cash ﬂow, Pt, which follows a geometric Brownian motion
dPt = µPtdt + σPtdzt,
where µ and σ are the drift and the volatility of the process respectively. In order to
invest, the entrepreneur pays an initial ﬁxed cost, K, and hires a labourer who earns
an instantaneous constant wage, w, until the production stops. We assume that there is
monopoly on the demand and supply sides of the labour market, therefore in order to
invest, the manager and the labourer (or a labour union) have to agree on a long-term
ﬁxed wage contract, w.
The union and the manager are risk neutral and have diﬀerent time preferences over
payoﬀs described respectively by discount factors e−γt and e−δt. The time preferences are
such that δ and γ are both greater than µ.
Bargaining structure
Agents play an alternating oﬀer game over wage contracts. If the entrepreneur has
the right to start the game, then the bargaining runs as follows.
Step 1
At time zero the manager observes the initial level of the cash ﬂow, Pt. At this level
of the state variable his (own evaluation of the) expected discounted cash ﬂows, minus
5See Binmore (1987) for a reﬁnement of the Rubinstein result in terms of subgame perfection.








which represents the value of the ‘pie’ (the net value of the investment) to the eyes of the
entrepreneur.
Once the value of the pie is known, the manager makes an oﬀer to the union. If the
union accepts this oﬀer the manager obtains a share of the pie, say α∆(Pt) and the union










We will use the tilde to refer to one player’s payoﬀ under the oﬀer of the other player.
Under this agreement the investment starts and the instantaneous constant wage, w,
is determined because the union’s share of the pie is equal to w/δ.
Step 2
If the union rejects the manager’s oﬀer, at time t + ∆ (one period ahead), the union
makes a proposal. The union observes the state variable Pt+∆, calculates the value of the








and makes an oﬀer to the manager. If the oﬀer is accepted the game ends and invest-








If the oﬀer is rejected, the game continues with steps 1 and 2 repeating until an oﬀer
is accepted. If the bargaining never reaches an agreement, both players receive zero6.
2 Characterisation of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Payoﬀs
In this section, we brieﬂy characterise the set of stationary subgame perfect (SSP) payoﬀs
by deﬁning its supremum and inﬁmum. In the following section, this characterisation
6Because the time preferences are greater than the drift of the process, the expected discounted value
of the pie shrinks to zero as in the deterministic case.
6allows us to investigate uniqueness by checking whether the supremum and the inﬁmum
are equal. In such a case the SSP set shrinks to a single point.
Let A(Pt) and a(Pt) (B(Pt) and b(Pt)) denote respectively the supremum and the
inﬁmum of the share for the manager, player M, (the union, player U) in any perfect
equilibrium of the game when he (she) is the proposer. And let ˜ A(Pt) and ˜ a(Pt) ( ˜ B(Pt)
and ˜ b(Pt)) be the supremum and the inﬁmum when M (U) is the responder.
Consider the subgame beginning at time t with an oﬀer made by M. In this subgame
any oﬀer made by M which gives U a share greater than EtB(Pt+∆)e−δ∆ will be accepted
by U (being B(Pt+∆) the supremum of the share to U at his turn one period ahead).
Then M can guarantee at least a share
Pt
γ − µ




and U can obtain at most
EtB(Pt+∆)e
−δ∆ ≥ ˜ B(Pt). (5)
Now consider an oﬀer made by M which gives U a share less than Etb(Pt+∆)e−δ∆.
Any proposal like this will be rejected by U (being b(Pt+∆) the inﬁmum of the share U
earns next stage). Therefore
˜ b(Pt) ≥ Etb(Pt+∆)e
−δ∆ (6)
and the best M can obtain by making an acceptable proposal is Pt
γ−µ−K−Etb(Pt+∆)e−δ∆ δ
γ.
If U rejects this oﬀer then M, as responder next stage, will receive at most Et ˜ A(Pt+∆)e−γ∆.












Combining 4 and 7 with the deﬁnition of supremum and inﬁmum gives the lower and
upper bounds to the set of SSP payoﬀs to M, that is:
Pt
γ − µ
− K − EtB(Pt+∆)e
−δ∆δ
γ













Similarly 5 and 6 yield bounds for the set of SSP payoﬀs to U, as responder, which are
given by
Etb(Pt+∆)e
−δ∆ ≤ ˜ b(Pt) ≤ ˜ B(Pt) ≤ EtB(Pt+∆)e
−δ∆. (9)
7Repeating the same argument for the subgame beginning at time t+∆, with a proposal
made by U (where U oﬀers more than Et+∆A(Pt+2∆)e−γ∆ or less than Et+∆a(Pt+2∆)e−γ∆),


























−γ∆ ≤ ˜ a(Pt+∆) ≤ ˜ A(Pt+∆) ≤ Et+∆A(Pt+2∆)e
−γ∆. (11)
3 Uniqueness of SSP Payoﬀs
Deﬁnition 1. Optimal stopping time (OST). Corresponding to
i) any SSP payoﬀ
¯ α(Pt) =
(
A(Pt) for M proposing at t,
˜ A(Pt) for U proposing at t.
there is an OST, τ¯ α = {minn ≥ 0 : ¯ α(Pn) ≥ supj>n En¯ α(Pj)e−γ(j−n)}.
ii) any SSP payoﬀ
¯ β(Pt) =
(
B(Pt) for U proposing at t,
˜ B(Pt) for M proposing at t.
there is an OST, τ¯ β = {minn ≥ 0 : ¯ β(Pn) ≥ supj>n En¯ β(Pj)e−δ(j−n)}.
It follows that extremal SSP payoﬀs (¯ α(Pt), ¯ β(Pt)) would be proposed or accepted at
any time t ≥ max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β} because neither player, by the deﬁnition of OST, could improve
his best outcome.
Note that the assumption on the existence of OST yielding extremal payoﬀs just
excludes the trivial solution7 (0,0).
We will proceed as follows. First one can use deﬁnition 1 to calculate the max in 8 and
10 when the initial level of the state variable Pt is such that t ≥ max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β}. Then the
7If an optimal stopping rule does not exist, in the sense that either τ¯ α or τ¯ β is inﬁnite, then
max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β} = ∞. This implies that an agreement (yielding extremal payoﬀs) never occurs and
(¯ α(Pt) = 0, ¯ β(Pt) = 0). Then the supremum to M and U is zero and the set of SSP payoﬀs would
only contain the disagreement point.
8upper bound to M and U can be solved recursively. If extremal payoﬀs like ( Pt
γ−µ − K,0)
can be ruled out by the convergence of the upper bound, then there is a unique SSP payoﬀ
at which an agreement occurs at the ﬁrst round of the game.
Combining the last inequality in 11 with deﬁnition 1 i), where j − n can be set equal












Also, by deﬁnition 1 i) (with j −n = 2∆) it must be A(Pt) ≥ EtA(Pt+2∆)e−γ2∆ which
combined with 12 yields
EtA(Pt+2∆)e
−γ2∆ ≤ A(Pt) ≤
Pt
γ − µ















where the right hand side can be solved recursively. Using for brevity the notation
c1 = 1−e−(δ−µ)∆
γ−µ and c2 = 1 − e−δ∆ at the nth iteration, 14 expands as follows:













As n → ∞, then EtA(Pt+n2∆)e−n(δ+γ)∆ converges to 0. This follows the fact that
A(Pt+n2∆) ≤
Pt+2n∆





















Therefore as n → ∞, the upper bound to A(Pt), with t ≥ max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β}, converges to
Ptc1
1 − e−(γ+δ−2µ)∆ −
Kc2
1 − e−(δ+γ)δ ≥ A(Pt). (17)
9Regarding U, a similar straightforward calculation at time t+∆ ≥ max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β} yields
the upper bound to U, i.e.

Pt+∆c3







where c3 = 1−e−(γ−µ)∆
γ−µ and c3 = 1 − e−γ∆.
It is now straightforward to show that the lower bound and upper bound are the same.










− K − Et

Pt+∆c3













A(Pt) = a(Pt) =
Ptc1
1 − e−(γ+δ−2µ)∆ −
Kc2
1 − e−(δ+γ)δ. (20)
Moreover combining 10, 18 and 20 yields
B(Pt+∆) = b(Pt+∆) =

Pt+∆c3







Therefore, one concludes that at any level of cash ﬂow, Pt (with t ≥ max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β}), M
(U) always proposes an allocation yielding α∆(Pt) = A(Pt) = a(Pt) (β∆(Pt) = B(Pt) =
b(Pt)) when he (she) is the proposer at t, and accepts a share ˜ α∆(Pt) = Etα∆(Pt+∆)e−γ∆
(˜ β∆(Pt) = Etβ∆(Pt+∆)e−δ∆) when U (M) is the proposer at t8. Moreover, as the SSP

















it follows that an agreement occurs at the ﬁrst round of the game with (SSP) equilib-
rium payoﬀs to M and U equal to (α∆(Pt),Etβ∆(Pt+∆)e−δ∆), when M is the proposer at
t, and equal to (Etα∆(Pt+∆)e−γ∆,β∆(Pt)), when U makes a proposal.
8The subscript ∆ is to remind us that we are in discrete time and the outcome depends on ∆.
104 Timing of the agreement
The objective of this section is to solve the optimal stopping time problem for both players
in order to ﬁnd max{τ¯ α,τ¯ β}.
As this does not change the result about uniqueness but makes the calculation easier,
we will proceed by analysing the continuous-time case. As ∆ → 0
α∆(Pt) =
Ptc1
















































for M and U respectively.
First, we will solve a general stopping problem associated with a geometric Brownian
motion.
Proposition 1. Assuming the time preference, r, is greater than the drift of the







−(µ − σ2) ±
p
(µ − σ2)2 + 2σ2r)

/σ2.
Proof As Etg(Pτ)e−(τ−t)r = EtEτg(Pτ)e−(τ−t)r = g(P ∗)Ete−(τ−t)r then the problem re-
duces to solving the term Ete−(τ−t)r.
We will use a martingale theorem for stopping times9. If τ is a stopping time, then
we can deﬁne a martingale Ete−
ξ2
2 (τ−t)+ξ∆Z(τ−t) = 1 for any ξ ∈ R. This property can be
9See Ross (1996), pp. 381-302.





































σ(µ−σ2/2)](τ−t) = Ete−(τ−t)r. It fol-




σ(µ − σ2/2)] = r; this gives the two roots ξ = 
−(µ − σ2) ±
p
(µ − σ2)2 + 2σ2r)

/σ. Notice that ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 < 0 being r > 0.
Observe that Ete−(τ−t)r ≤ 1 for t ≤ τ so it must be Pt ≤ P ∗ for ξ > 0 and Pt ≥ P ∗







































Notice that in our case α(Pt) and β(Pt) are straight lines with positive slope and strictly
positive payoﬀs when an agreement occurs. Therefore, one can focus on the case where
g(P ∗) > 0, g0(P ∗) > 0 and g00(P ∗) = 0. In particular, given the restriction on g(P ∗) and
g0(P ∗), the foc can be easily rearranged as g0(P ∗)P ∗/g(P ∗) = λ where the left hand side











As already argued, this implies that for t ≤ τ, the state variable, Pt, will approach the
trigger P ∗ from below, i.e. Pt ≤ P ∗.









































Solving the maximisation problems yields













(γ − µ)(δ + γ − 2µ)δK
(δ − µ)(δ + γ)
, (28)













(δ + γ − 2µ)γK
(δ + γ)
. (29)
Observe that being γ and δ greater than µ, then λM and λU are greater than 1 and,
hence, PM and PU are strictly positive.
It can be easily shown11 that if γ < δ, then PM > PU. This implies max{τα,τβ} = τα.
If instead γ ≥ δ then PM ≤ PU and max{τα,τβ} = τβ, then one concludes that at any
initial level of the state variable Pt ≥ max{PM,PU} there is immediate agreement yielding
payoﬀs (α(Pt),β(Pt)).
4.1 Timing and Eﬃciency of an Agreement
The aim of this subsection is to show that when Pt starts below max{PM,PU} an imme-
diate agreement occurs at any initial level of the state variable satisfying Pt > P where,
as we will show, P ≤ max{PM,PU}. In other words, if Pt starts below P no immediate
agreement is feasible and necessarily there will be a delay until Pt approaches P. The
question is whether or not this delay reﬂects Pareto ineﬃciency in the bargaining.
We will proceed as follows. By using the previous result, we will calculate P, the
“lower bound” to the initial level of the cash ﬂow Pt, preventing delay. In doing this,
we will show that Pareto optimality arises implicitly. This result implies that delay in
agreement/investment is due to hysteresis12 rather than any ineﬃciency in the bargaining
process.
With a slight change of notation, we will ﬁrst draw a general formulation and, at the
end of this section, the speciﬁc results will be provided.
As proved in the previous section, for Pt ≥ max{PM,PU} there is immediate agreement
yielding payoﬀs (α(Pt),β(Pt)); moreover max{PM,PU} = Pj where j = M for γ < δ and
11See Cripps, 1997, p.544.
12See Dixit (1989).
13j = U for γ ≥ δ. Let player i be 6= j and ri and rj be the time preferences (δ, γ). Also let
g(.) = α(.) and g(.) = β(.)δ/γ when j = M. Otherwise, let g(.) = β(.)δ/γ and g(.) = α(.)
when j = U13. If the initial level of the state variable, Pt, starts below Pj, then player
j has an expected discounted SSP payoﬀ equal to g(Pj)(Pt/Pj)λj. Therefore, any earlier
oﬀer from player i, which does not guarantee g(Pj)(Pt/Pj)λj to j, will be rejected. On
the other hand, if player i beneﬁts from an earlier agreement, he will not oﬀer more than
j’s reservation payoﬀ. Then, if there is any advantage for i to make an early oﬀer, this
must yield g(Pj)(Pt/Pj)λj to j, and the residual payoﬀ Pt/(γ − µ) − K − g(Pj)(Pt/Pj)λj
to i. Therefore, if there is any gain from an earlier agreement i makes an oﬀer as soon
as Pt ≥ P, where










Notice that, by using the stopping-problem technique introduced before, the threshold


































We will ﬁrst show that 31 holds; this implies that if Pt starts suﬃciently low there is
an advantage in reaching an earlier agreement and not delaying until the cash ﬂow crosses
the threshold level Pj. Then we will show that condition 31 implies Pareto optimality.
Let ¯ g(P,Pt) =
h
P
γ−µ − K − g(Pj)(P/Pj)λj
i
(Pt/P)λi, by 30 it follows that ¯ g(P,Pt) ≥
¯ g(P 0,Pt) for any P 0 6= P and any Pt ≤ P. Take P 0 = Pj, then
¯ g(P,Pt) ≥ ¯ g(Pj,Pt) (32)














13Notice that these payoﬀs are deﬁned as evaluated by the manager, this permits us to generalise the
notation.
14It is straightforward to notice that the equality holds, i.e. ¯ g(P,Pt) = g(Pj)(Pt/Pj)λi iﬀ
γ = δ, and in such a case Pj = max{PM,PU} = P and there can be no earlier agreement
for Pt < Pj.
Therefore, for any initial level of cash ﬂows, Pt, satisfying P ≤ Pt ≤ Pj (with P
deﬁned by 30), there is an immediate agreement, which yields SSP outcomes to j and i





− K − g(Pj)(Pt/Pj)
λj. (34)
Implicitly, in this last calculation there arises the condition for the Pareto optimal-
ity of an earlier agreement yielding a SSP partition of the pie. In fact, one can use the
following deﬁnition, with g and g0 restricted to be SSP outcomes, and then compare the
following deﬁnition to 32.. Pareto optimality14. Let (g, τ) be an outcome, where g is a
share of the pie and τ is the random time at which agreement occurs. An outcome (g, τ)
is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome (g0, τ0) such that Etg0e−rτ0 ≥ Etge−rτ for
any Pt with the strict inequality for some Pt.
Summary of SSP outcomes
We conclude this section summarising the SSP outcomes for any initial level of the
state variable and values of γ and δ. Let SM and SU be the SSP payoﬀs to M and U
respectively (as evaluated by the manager). Then we have the following results:



















if P ≤ Pt < max{PM,PU}





− K − α(PM)(Pt/PM)
λM (36)













14We use an ex ante deﬁnition of Pareto optimality as in Merlo and Wilson (1995, p.384).
15if Pt < P there is no immediate agreement and the expected discounted payoﬀs of
an agreement at P are:


































(γ − µ)(δ + γ − 2µ)δK




(δ + γ − 2µ)γK
(δ + γ)
,
with PM > PU iﬀ δ > γ.




















where 40 and 41 can be derived by rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions of problem 30.
Last, for δ = γ
P = PM = PU. (42)
In Figure 1, we show the equilibrium outcome of the sequential bargaining when
δ > γ and, hence, PM > PU. In this case, it is intuitive that the more patient player,
– the manager –, should guarantee a larger expected payoﬀ. In fact, as expected, the
blue line, representing SM(Pt), is always above the red line, which represents SU(Pt).
Last, notice that according to 3.41, SU(Pt) ‘smooth-pastes’ the grey, continuous curve,
representing the residual payoﬀ Pt
γ−µ − K − SM(Pt), and the tangency between the two
curves is guaranteed by the fact that P maximises the union’s expected payoﬀ.
165 Comparison with the Nash Bargaining Solution
We are now ready to give a technical result, but nonetheless useful when one wants to
compare the SSP outcome of sequential bargaining with the Nash bargaining outcome.
A more simple bargaining procedure was introduced by Nash (1950) and the bargain-
ing protocol is described as follows. Each player simultaneously demands a share of the
pie; if the demands are feasible, given the size of the pie, then the players receive their
demands otherwise they receive their disagreement payoﬀs. The main diﬀerence with
respect to the sequential bargaining is that the Nash protocol implies the existence of
a cooperative framework where players can commit to demands and disagreement pay-
oﬀs. Most importantly, one can imagine an umpire who guarantees players will stick to
their commitments. Then the cooperative framework is meant to enforce threats and
commitments15.
As the Nash bargaining outcome is not the central issue of this paper, we will only
introduce the main conditions which permit one to derive the Nash bargaining solution,
and we refer the reader to Nash (1950, 1953).
Nash (1953) stated axioms which the solution to this bargaining situation should
satisfy, and, in turn, these axioms allow one to restrict the set of solutions to a single
point. It can be proved that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to the above
bargaining situation, which satisﬁes these axioms. In particular, the Nash bargaining
solution can be derived by maximising the product of each agent’s surplus16.
We will deﬁne the Nash bargaining in a stochastic environment following the charac-
terisation by Perraudin and Psillaki (1999).
In our bargaining situation, each agent’s surplus corresponds to a demand, say, DM,
DU and the disagreement payoﬀs is zero when no wage-contract has been agreed upon. In
particular, the expected discounted payoﬀs of an agreement are DM(Pt) = [P/(γ − µ) −
























15See van Damme (1991, p.160) for a discussion on commitment and cooperation regarding the Nash
bargaining solution.
16See Binmore and Dasgupta (1987, pp.32-37)













Observe that 44 guarantees Pareto optimality of the outcome17 in that each agent has
the same trade oﬀ (marginal rate of substitution) between the timing of the agreement and
payoﬀ from the agreement. Then one can refer to 44 as Pareto optimality (or eﬃciency)
condition.
Condition 45 is related to the bargaining power of players in the negotiation. If
any asymmetry in the negotiation is correctly reﬂected in the agreement payoﬀs and the
bargaining protocol is symmetric18, then agents have the same bargaining power19. We
will refer to 45 as Symmetry condition. Perraudin and Psillaki (1999) use the generalised
version of the Nash bargaining with an exogenous parameter capturing any asymmetry
in the bargaining protocol so they refer to this condition as Bargaining condition.
From 44-45, one can derive the Nash bargaining outcome (P ∗ and w∗), which allows
us to make an immediate comparison with the sequential bargaining20.




































The comparison with the sequential bargaining is quite immediate. Just notice that
the Rubinstein SSP outcome is Pareto optimal at Pt = P and therefore it must satisfy
17Pareto eﬃciency is one of axioms which the Nash bargaining solution satisﬁes.
18In the sense that the bargaining procedure -for instance the sequence of moves- does not give any
advantage to either player.
19See Nash (1953, p.138).
20See also Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for a comparison between the Rubinstein and the
Nash bargaining in the deterministic case.
18the eﬃciency conditions 47-48. In fact, as already found in 40 and 41, at Pt = P, the SSP




















to M and U respectively, and these are nothing but the eﬃciency conditions of the Nash
bargaining problem (see 47, 48). Geometrically, this implies that there exists a straight









which crosses the eﬃcient outcome (Di(P ∗), P ∗) of the Nash bargaining and the eﬃcient
outcome (Si(P), P) of the sequential bargaining for player i = M,U and j 6= i. This
comparison is depicted in Figure 2, where, in particular, we show the case where δ > γ,
that is the labour union is more impatient than the manager.






λU−λM is positive when δ > γ which, in turn, implies λU > λM (and λi is always greater
than 1). Combining this with the fact that in a sequential bargaining the more patient
player can always guarantee a bigger share of the pie, implies that the eﬃcient outcome
in the Nash bargaining occurs at a lower level of cash ﬂow than the eﬃcient outcome in
the sequential bargaining. A similar reasoning applies in the reverse case where δ < γ
and the same conclusion holds, that is Nash bargaining accelerates agreement. In other
words, this means that P ∗ < P for γ 6= δ (and P ∗ = P = PM = PU for δ = γ) and, hence,
the lack of a cooperative environment delays agreements and investment decisions.
19Conclusions
The main result provided by this paper refers to the uniqueness of the subgame perfect
equilibrium in a sequential bargaining where the underlying surplus follows a geometric
Brownian motion. The uniqueness of the equilibrium implies that at any initial level of
the state variable, players always play the same SSP strategy. The only requirement in
order to obtain this result is the restriction over the time preferences, bounded to be
greater than the drift of the stochastic process. The SSP equilibrium outcome found does
not diﬀer from that derived by Cripps. However, the central issue to the present paper
consists of proving the uniqueness of such an outcome.
The additional contribution of the current paper is to highlight other features of the
equilibrium. If the initial level of the state variable is suﬃciently low players wait until
the cash ﬂows increase up to a trigger level P, where agreement occurs. This agreement
partition is eﬃcient as it satisﬁes the Pareto optimality condition. Therefore a delay in
the agreement is due to the fact that not any state contingent outcome can be agreed
upon in the current period. This means that for a low level of cash ﬂows, the sum of
the expected agreement payoﬀs may exceeds the overall value of the agreement surplus
(which can be negative because of an initial ﬁxed cost). In fact, it is intuitive that if the
ﬁxed cost, K, is zero, there is an immediate agreement for any initial level of the cash
ﬂow (just notice that Pj = max{PM,PU} tends to zero as K = 0).
Furthermore, a technical, but nonetheless useful, result is achieved by providing a
comparison between the sequential and the Nash bargaining outcome. This comparison
can contribute to explicitly address timing considerations. In fact, the unique equilibrium
entry trigger derived under the non-cooperative scenario cannot be solved analytically.
However, as the Nash and the Rubinstein outcomes are Pareto eﬃcient, a relation be-
tween the two investment threshold levels can be established. This relation highlights
the investment delay arising in a non-cooperative bargaining compared to the cooperative
one. The lack of an exogenous mechanism aimed at enforcing contracts results into entry
delay rather than into ineﬃciency.
Last, we stress that in the current paper we have analysed the relation between the
Rubinstein and the Nash symmetric bargaining with the purpose of highlighting timing
considerations of the Rubinstein outcome. However, in the deterministic case, the relation
between the sequential bargaining and the asymmetric Nash bargaining has been the
object of great eﬀort in game theory. The asymmetric (or generalised) Nash bargaining
takes into account any asymmetry by means of an exogenous parameter representing the
20relative bargaining power. As the time interval between oﬀers and counteroﬀers tends
to zero, a well known result to game theory scholars is that the Rubinstein outcome
approaches the Nash solution with bargaining power equal to the relative time preferences
of the Rubinstein model. Whether uncertainty may aﬀect this result is left for further
research.
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FIGURE 2: Alternating-offer equilibrium values and Nash Bargaining 
solution when  γ δ >  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 